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This dissertation consists of three essays on the 
evaluation of social programs. All three essays consider 
general evaluation questions in the specific context of 
evaluating the impact of government job training 
programs on the earnings of those who participate in 
them. 
The first essay, jointly authored with James 
Heckman, examines three issues related to 
"Ashenfelter's dip"-the empirical regularity that the 
mean earnings of participants in employment and 
training programs generally decline during the period 
just prior to participation. This pattern was originally 
identified in Ashenfelter (1978) and has since been 
observed for participants in many other employment 
and training programs. 
The first implication of Ashenfelter's dip for 
econometric evaluation research is the question it raises 
about what would have happened to participants had 
they not participated. The fundamental evaluation 
problem is that no person is ever observed 
simultaneously as both a participant and a 
nonparticipant in the program being evaluated. That is, 
in the context of a training program, the most that is 
ever observed is either what happens to the person if he 
or she did take training or what happens to the person if 
he or she did not take training, but never both. The 
difficult part of evaluations is constructing the 
unobserved counterfactual outcome that participants 
would have obtained had they not participated. This 
counterfactual is needed in order to determine the 
impact that the program has on its participants. 
Ashenfelter's dip makes it clear that participants are 
systematically different from nonparticipants in the 
period prior to participation, and raises the question of 
whether the earnings and employment losses reflected 
in the dip are permanent or transitory. 
I address this question in Chapter II. Using 
experimental data from the recent National JTPA Study 
(NJS), I show what the counterfactual mean outcome is 
for participants. In a properly designed experiment, the 
outcomes of the experimental control group indicate 
what would have happened to participants had they not 
participated. Using the controls from the NJS, I show 
that for adult males and females, and for male and 
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female youth, the dip in mean earnings is transitory. In 
each case, the mean returns to its pre-dip level within 
six months after random assignment. For all the groups 
other than adult males, the dip is followed by growth in 
the earnings mean above pre-random-assignment levels 
in the post-random-assignment period. 
This counterfactual earnings behavior has important 
implications for the most commonly used simple 
estimators of program impacts. These implications 
constitute the second issue addressed in Chapter II. I 
show that the pattern of earnings displayed by the 
control group indicates that before-after estimators, in 
which the pre-program experience of participants 
themselves serves as the estimate of the counterfactual 
outcome, are upwardly biased, with the extent of the 
upward bias depending on the particular "before" and 
"after" periods used to construct the estimates. This 
strong upward bias is consistent with the large positive 
impact estimates obtained in early evaluations of 
federal employment and training programs in the 
United States that used such comparisons. 
More recent evaluations use a comparison group of 
nonparticipants whose earnings behavior serves as a 
benchmark against which to compare the earnings 
behavior of the program participants. The simplest, and 
most widely used, comparison group estimator is the 
"difference-in-differences" estimator, in which the 
before-after earnings change of the comparison group 
is subtracted from the before-after earnings change of 
the participants. This estimator is motivated by a model 
in which persons select into a program based on a 
fixed, person-specific component of earnings. This 
componentis then differenc,ed out in the estimation 
procedure. I evaluate the performance of the 
difference-in-differences estimator relative to the 
experimental estimates using two different comparison 
groups. The first consists of ITPA-eligible 
nonparticipants (ENPs) from four of the sites in the 
NJS and the second consists of a national sample of 
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persons eligible for JTPA drawn from the 1986 Full 
Panel of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP). Both samples are superior to the 
comparison group data used in earlier studies. In 
particular, the ENPs are drawn from the same local 
labor markets and administered the same surveys as the 
experimental sample. Both the ENPs and the SIPP 
eligibles are all known to be eligible for JTPA. Though 
the ENP sample generally performs better than the 
SIPP sample in the sense that the estimates obtained 
using it are closer to the experimental benchmark, for 
both samples the difference-in-differences estimates 
differ substantially from the experimental estimates. 
These differences result primarily from the post-
program earnings growth observed for the controls. 
This growth is not observed in the comparison group 
samples for most demographic groups, with the result 
that the difference-in-differences estimates also tend to 
show an upward bias. Furthermore, the estimates are 
quite sensitive to the "before" and "after" periods used 
in constructing them. This sensitivity results in part 
from the post-program earnings growth, and in part 
from the effects of Ashenfelter's dip, which is also not 
observed in either comparison group. 
The regular appearance of Ashenfelter's dip among 
participants in a wide variety of employment and 
training programs has led later researchers such as 
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Card and Sullivan 
(1988) to focus on employment and earnings processes 
as the driving forces behind participation in 
employment and training programs when constructing 
econometric models of the participation process. The 
final section of Chapter II examines what can be 
learned about the determinants of participation in JTPA 
from the ENP and control data from the NJS for the 
four training centers for which both samples are 
available. 
This analysis reveals that the earlier literature's focus 
exclusively on earnings and employment, which was 
motivated in part by Ashenfelter's dip and in part by the 
limitations ofthe available data, leaves out an important 
part of the story. I find that labor force status, defined as 
the usual CPS trinity of employed, unemployed, and 
out of the labor force, plays an important role in the 
participation process beyond that played by earnings or 
employment. Using as a metric the ability to predict 
who among the combined ENP and control samples 
will and will not participate, I find that labor force 
status patterns in the seven months up to and including 
the month of the participation decision do better than 
measures based solely on earnings or employment, 
particularly for groups other than adult males. The 
patterns most likely to lead to participation in JTPA are 
a recent transition into unemployment from either 
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employment or from out of the labor force. Among 
those employed or out of the labor force at the time of 
the participation decision, those who have recently 
entered these states are relatively more likely to 
participate in JTPA than those who have not. Thus, 
participants tend to be those whose labor force status is 
in flux, particularly the recently unemployed. This 
finding is consistent with the fact that both JTPA and its 
predecessor programs CETA and MDTA provide not 
only traditional classroom training, but also job search 
assistance and placement services that would be of 
interest to unemployed persons looking for immediate 
employment rather than for more traditional classroom 
training. 
Chapter III, which is also jointly authored with 
James Heckman, examines the determinants of 
selection into the JTPA program more broadly. Rather 
than focusing on a single transition from eligibility to 
acceptance as in the first essay, the enrollment process 
is decomposed into a series of stages, from eligibility 
for JTPA, to awareness of JTPA, to acceptance into 
JTPA and finally to formal enrollment in the program. 
Decomposing the process in this way indicates the 
sources of observed demographic differences in JTPA 
participation rates that have troubled some observers of 
the program. It also sheds light on the extent to which 
demographic differences result from individual self-
selection or from the actions of program administers. 
Because JTPA is not an entitlement program likeAFDC 
or Food Stamps, program administrators have 
substantial discretion over whom to serve and how to 
serve them. There is a concern that the structure of the 
bureaucratic performance standards system within 
JTPA encourages program bureaucrats to "cream-
skim" by bringing in only the most employable persons 
within the JTPA-eligible population. 
Chapter III begins with a systematic analysis of the 
determinants of the transition at each stage of the 
overall process of enrollment in JTPA, while the final 
section presents decompositions that combine some or 
all of the stages and reveal the relative importance of 
particular factors at different stages. This analysis 
yields several important findings. First, I find some 
evidence consistent with cream-skimming by program 
bureaucrats. Most of this evidence is concentrated at 
the stage from acceptance into the program (indicated 
here by random assignment) and formal enrollment. 
Second, I find that informational barriers such as lack 
of fluency in English and low levels of completed 
schooling act to discourage participation conditional on 
eligibility, but that these differences do not fully 
account for the differentially low rate of Hispanic 
enrollment in JTPA found in other studies. Third, I 
show that the importance of labor force status 
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transitions, already pointed out in Chapter II, is 
concentrated at the stage from awareness of JTPA to 
acceptance into it. Fourth, I show that the participation 
patterns of AFDC and Food Stamp recipients differ 
markedly from those of other groups. They are 
relatively more likely to be aware of the program than 
other eligibles, but less likely to enroll in the program 
conditional on acceptance. Finally, and more broadly, 
this analysis shows that manipulation of program 
eligibility rules constitutes a weak tool for increasing 
the participation of particular groups. Some groups, 
including some cited as being particularly in need of 
JTPA services, have much lower rates of participation 
conditional on eligibility than do others. Increasing the 
participation of these groups requires more active 
measures than simply broadening the eligibility rules to 
include them. 
In Chapter IV, I focus on the measurement of 
earnings dynamics among the low-income population 
eligible for training in JTPA. This essay is part of a 
larger project that also examines the measurement of 
earnings levels within this population. Accurate 
measurement of both the level and temporal pattern of 
earnings is crucial to obtaining reliable estimates of 
program impact and of the determinants of program 
participation. 
Chapter IV compares the dynamics of mean 
earnings in two samples of persons eligible for training 
under JTPA. The first sample is drawn from the 1988 
Full Panel of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), while the second is a sample of 
eligible nonparticipants (ENPs) at four of the sixteen 
sites in the National JTPA Study. These are the same 
two samples used as comparison groups in Chapter 11-
with the exception that the SIPP sample is drawn from' 
the 1988 panelrather than the 1986 panel. In that 
chapter, I show that the structure of the eligibility rules 
for the JTPA program, which require either low family 
income in the six months prior to application or 
participation in certain means-tested transfer programs 
at the time of application, can lead to a dip in the mean 
family income of eligibles in the months just prior to 
the month of measured eligibility. Examining this result 
empirically in Chapter IV, I find that this dip appears in 
the mean individual earnings of adult male and adult 
female SIPP eligibles but not in the mean individual 
earnings of the ENPs. The failure of the dip to appear in 
the data on the individual earnings of youth can be 
explained by the fact that the earnings of youth 
typically represent only a small portion of total family 
income, which is the income that counts for JTPA 
eligibility. In contrast, the absence of a dip in the mean 
earnings of adult ENPs is more difficult to account for. 
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I examine two alternative explanations for the 
difference in earnings dynamics between the two 
samples. The first is that the lack of a dip in the mean 
earnings of adult ENPs is accounted for by the 
exclusion of areas with low poverty rates from the ENP 
sampling frame. Persons eligible for JTPA in areas with 
low poverty rates are differentially nonpoor. At the 
same time, in the SIPP sample, nonpoor eligibles show 
a much more powerful dip in mean earnings prior to 
measured eligibility, as they must in order to be become 
eligible for the program. I show that the number of 
nonpoor eligibles excluded at the four sites in the 
National JTPA Study is too small to account for the 
absence of a dip in mean earnings in the ENP sample. 
The second explanation builds on differences in the 
survey instruments used to collect earnings data on the 
two samples. The survey administered to the ENPs 
resembles that used for the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth in that both surveys collect earnings 
information indirectly through questions about 
particular job spells. On the two ENP surveys, for each 
job reported in an interview, one value for average 
hours worked per week is collected. Two values for the 
rate of pay, the starting wage and the current or ending 
wage, are collected for most jobs paid by the hour. For 
other jobs, only the pay period (week, month, etc.) and 
the usual pay per period are collected. Collecting the 
data in this way implicitly removes all variation within 
job spells in hours worked or in rate of pay. The 
additional information collected in both surveys on 
overtime pay, tips and bonuses, as well as the limited 
information on weeks worked without pay collected on 
the follow-up survey, also has no variation within job 
spells. Thus, the structure of the survey instruments 
administered to the ENPs forces all of the temporal 
variation in measured earnings for individual ENPs to 
result from either job loss, job gain, or crossing the 
seam between the time periods covered in the two 
surveys. 
In contrast, the SIPP survey collects earnings 
information directly from questions about earnings in 
each month on each of the two jobs for which the 
respondent reports working the most hours in each 
four-month SIPP survey reference period. Information 
on earnings from businesses is collected in the same 
way. This method of collecting earnings information 
allows variation in earnings from month to month on 
each job. Furthermore, by having interviews every four 
months, the SIPP respondents are less likely to forget 
periods of increased or reduced earnings that might be 
lost in the ENP surveys due to the long (five years for 
the baseline survey and 18 months or more for the 
follow-up survey) recall periods required. 
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If the dip in mean earnings prior to eligibility results 
primarily from job loss and job gain, then both surveys 
should, in principle, pick it up. On the other hand, if the 
dip results primarily from within-spell reductions in 
earnings due to periods of absence from work without 
pay, reduced overtime or temporary layoff, then only 
the SIPP instrument will capture it in the data. To shed 
some light on which of these two hypotheses is the 
correct one, I smooth out the SIPP data by taking the 
total earnings from each employment spell and 
assigning an equal fraction to each month of the spell. 
This replicates the smoothing induced in the ENP 
earnings data by the ENP survey instrument. 
Examination of the smoothed SIPP data reveals that the 
smoothing process removes the dip in mean earnings in 
the months prior to measured eligibility. The same 
result obtains when the SIPP earnings are smoothed 
over job spells rather than employment spells. These 
findings constitute strong evidence that the lack of a dip 
among the ENPs results from the failure of the survey 
instruments administered to that sample to effectively 
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capture the within-spell changes in earnings that 
underlie the dip in the mean earnings of JTPA eligibles. 
More generally, these findings show that choices about 
survey design have important implications for our 
ability to accurately measure earnings dynamics among 
the poor. 
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